South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Volume 10
Issue 2 Spring 2014

Article 6

2014

Corruption and Catalan Independence
Ryan T. Judd
University of South Carolina School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Judd, Ryan T. (2014) "Corruption and Catalan Independence," South Carolina Journal of International Law
and Business: Vol. 10 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb/vol10/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons.
For more information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

CORRUPTION AND CATALAN
INDEPENDENCE
Ryan T. Judd*
It pleases me to speak the language of
those wise ones,
Who filled the world with their customs
and laws,
The language of those strong ones who
kings respected,
They defended their rights, they avenged
their injuries.
Bonaventura Carles Aribaul
INTRODUCTION

Just over a decade through the doorway of the new millennium,
rumblings of independence from territories within established
European nations have steadily gathered into an ominous storm on
the political horizon-such that the rest of the world cannot help but
take notice. As Scotland moves steadily forward in its fight to secede
from the United Kingdom, with an eye toward a referendum vote on
independence in September 2014,2 its leaders simultaneously labor

*J.D., Class of 2014, University of South Carolina School of Law; M.A.
in Spanish, University of Georgia, 2003; B.A. in English, Vanderbilt
University, 1998.
' BONAVENTURA CARLES ARIBAU, LA PATRIA (1832), availableat http://
allpoetry.com/poem/8602085-La Patria -by-BonaventuraCarles Aribau

(stating in Catalan, "Plume encara parlar la llengua d'aquells sabis/Que
ompliren l'univers de Ilurs costums 6 lleys,/La llengua d'aquells forts que
acatdren los Reys,/Defengudren Ilurs drets, venjdren Ilurs agravis.")
(translation by author).
2 See Scotland's Future - Your Guide to an Independent Scotland,
ScoT.'S

REFERENDUM 2014, http://www.scotreferendum.com/reports/scotl

ands-future-your-guide-to-an-independent-scotland/

2014).

(last visited June 24,
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toward potential admission to the European Union. In Belgium, the
rising call by Dutch separatist groups in northern Flanders for
secession from the French-speaking Wallonia region looms over any
efforts by the newly crowned monarch to foster unification.4 Still
further south on the Mediterranean coast, the comunitat autanoma5 of
Catalonia presses toward its own referendum on independence, even
as Madrid declares such a prospect "illegal" under the national
constitution.6
Arguably, this recent trend toward territorial independence in
Europe was birthed in 1999, when NATO initiated military strikes
against Serbia in support of Kosovo's cause for independence.
Ultimately, Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 was
recognized by over ninety nations, including the United States and
most European Union members.8 In the wake of a secessionist
movement on the European continent, which found strong
international allies and ultimately achieved its goal, it was not long
before separatist groups in Scotland, Flanders, and Catalonia began
to press their own ambitions for independence.

See Severin Carrell, Scotland Calls for Urgent Talks on EU
Membership, GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2012, 1:48 PM), http://www.theguardian

.com/politics/2012/dec/10/scotland-urgent-talks-eu-membership.
4 See, e.g., Raf Casert & Mike Corder, Belgium Gets a New King, but
Politics Cast Shadow on Festivities, ARIz. DAILY STAR (July 22, 2013),

http://azstarnet.com/news/world/belgium-gets-a-new-king-but-politics-cast-s
hadow-on/article 538b9d06-2f80-5391-9b39-b74cl2283cbf.html.
5 Comunitat aut6noma means "autonomous community" in Catalan. An
autonomous community is a political and administrative territorial division
created by the Spanish Constitution of 1978 with the intention of preserving
the autonomy of the distinct cultures and communities that comprise the
nation. See Martin W. Lewis, The Nation, Nationalities, and Autonomous
Regions in Spain, GEOCURRENTS (Sept. 1, 2010, 3:27 PM), http://www.geoc

urrents.info/geopolitics/the-nation-nationalities-and-autonomous-regions-in-s
pain.
6 Konrad Yakabuski, Quebeckers Will Be Watching Catalonia,GLOBE
& MAIL, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ commentary/quebeckers-will-bewatching-catalonia/articlel3338440/ (last updated July 22, 2013, 7:16 AM);
see also Spanish PM: 'No Referendum, No Independencefor Catalonia,' RT

NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014, 1:25 PM), http://rt.com/news/catalonia-independence-r
eferendum-sovereignty-965/.
7 See Michael Freund, Opinion, From Kosovo to Catalonia,JERUSALEM
POST,8 Sept. 20, 2012, at 15.
id
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Although Kosovo certainly proved that autonomy for a
subnational territory is attainable in twenty-first-century Europe, the
resulting fledgling government was not successful.9 In May 2010,
the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that Kosovo was
struggling mightily with an "uneven rule of law" characterized by a
"weak justice system that [was] failing its citizens," along with
"widespread and growing" corruption.' 0 Despite continued efforts by
outside groups, most notably the European Union Rule of Law
Mission (EULEX), which arrived on the scene in 2008 to assist in
strengthening Kosovo's rule of law," it does not appear the situation
has improved, nor is it likely to improve in the foreseeable future.12
In October 2012, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) found that
despite EULEX's efforts in Kosovo, "[1]evels of organized crime and
corruption . . . remain high," while the judiciary "continues to suffer
from political interference, inefficiency and a lack of transparency
and enforcement."' 3 Further, the ECA expressed concern for the
near-total failure to establish the rule of law in the Serb-dominated
northern region of Kosovo, where crime bosses operate unchecked
by essentially Serb-run criminal courts and refuse to cooperate with
the U.N.-mandated Kosovo Police (KP).14 Tragically, these flaws
were illustrated all too clearly in September 2013 when a Lithuanian
member of EULEX was shot dead during a routine assignment near
the northern city of Mitrovica.
While the current dire situation in Kosovo is the product of its
own particular history and circumstances, it nevertheless begs crucial
questions for other historical European territories seeking their
9 See INT'L CRisis GRP. [ICG], THE RULE OF LAW IN INDEPENDENT
Kosovo, EUR. REPORT No. 204, at 22 (2010), availableat http://www.crisisgr
oup.org/-/media/Files/europe/balkans/kosovo/204%20The%20rule%20Ofo/2
OLaw%20in%201ndependent%20Kosovo.pdf
'o Id. at i.

" See What is EULEX?, EULEX Kosovo, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu

/en/info/whatisEulex.php (last visited June 20, 2014).
12 See Press Release, European Court of Auditors, Rule of Law
Assistance to Kosovo Not Sufficiently Effective (Oct. 30, 2012), availableat
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseECA- 12-41_en.htm.
'3

Id

ICG, supra note 9, at 19-22.
See EULEX Staff Member Shot Dead in North Kosovo, RADIO FREE

14See
15

(Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/kosovoeulex-member-shot-dead/25111077.html.
EUR. RADIO LIBERTY
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autonomy. As they emerge from the crucible that is the process of

independence, how quickly will these newly independent nations
develop from a rule of law standpoint? More specifically, will their
government infrastructure be strong enough to bear the pressure of
political transition, or will factors like crime and corruption impede
them from achieving the goals that they envisioned for their nations?
In Spain, where Catalonia's separatist movement has gathered
unprecedented strength in recent years, international rule of law and
anti-corruption organizations have noted particular vulnerabilities to
corruption in the current structure of the Spanish government.' 6
Those weaknesses were exposed 17 when Spain's prominent role in
the global financial crisis brought extensive scrutiny on the political
and economic dynamics that led to the European Union's C100
billion bailout of the Spanish banking sector in 2012.8 With each
new revelation of backroom deals between Spanish politicians and
bankers that helped bring about the current state of national austerity,
the prospect of a new start only grows more attractive for the Catalan
people. 19

In light of these circumstances, this note will examine the
present state of corruption in Spain and its potential effects on the
Catalan independence movement. Specifically, part I.A. will review
the history of Catalonia's struggle for independence, and Part I.B.
will explore the national and subnational framework under which the
current Catalan government exists. Part I.C. will evaluate the current
state of Catalonia's movement toward independence with an eye on
its future.
Shifting from a historical-political perspective to a rule of law
analysis, Part II.A. will focus on the laws, institutions, and
conventions that provide the legal structure for preventing corruption
within Spain and Catalonia. Part II.B. will assess the current state of
16See infra Part II.B.

See infra Part III.
18See David RomAn, Jonathan House & Vanessa Mock, Spain Banks
Face Europe's Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2012, at A6; see also
Benjamin Fox, Spain to Get Bank Bailout Next Week, EUOBSERVER (Apr.
12, 2012, 9:27 AM), http://euobserver.com/economic/118407.
19See Nicholas Siegel, As Spain Protests Austerity, CataloniaPushes
for Independence, GERMAN MARSHALL FuND U.S. BLOG (July 20, 2012),
http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/07/20/as-spain-protests-austerity-catalonia-pushe
s-for-independence/.
1
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corruption in Spain and Catalonia from the perspective of
international organizations and the Spanish people. Finally, Part III
will consider the effects that corruption could have on a potentially
independent Catalonia.

I.

THE RISE OF THE CATALAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
A.

ORIGINS OF CATALAN SEPARATISM

Catalonia has pursued separatist ambitions since the early
eighteenth century when the Treaty of Utrecht ended the War of the
Spanish Succession, and united all the territories of Spain under the
Bourbon monarch, Philip V.2 o In 1716, King Philip signed the Nueva
Planta decree, 2 1 which incorporated Catalonia into his centralized
administration and revoked its status as a distinct and autonomous
principality. 22
This pronouncement of a "New Order"
correspondingly "dissolved all Catalan political bodies, abolished its

20 See 2 STANLEY G. PAYNE, A HISTORY OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 351-

57 (1973), availableat http://libro.uca.edu/payne2/paynel6.htm. The War of
the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) was a struggle between two powerful
European alliances over the right to succeed King Charles II of Spain. See
id. at 351-52. On one side, Louis XIV of France sought the crown for his
grandson, Philip, and found support from Spain (except Aragon, Valencia,
and Catalonia) and the German states of Bavaria and Cologne. See id. at
352. The other side was led by Austria in an attempt to thwart the unification
of the French and Spanish crowns, with the support of England, the Crown of
Aragon, the German states of Prussia and Hanover, and the Netherlands. See
id. at 352-55. Under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), Philip was confirmed as
the successor to Charles II, but was compelled to renounce any right to the
French throne for himself or his descendants. See id. at 358.
21The Decretos de Nueva Planta (1706-1716) were a series of orders
issued by Philip V's court-both during and after the War of the Spanish
Succession-that invalidated the ancient charters, orfueros, of the polities
that had formerly been subject to the Crown of Aragon. See id. at 355.
Pursuant to modeling Spain after the centralized state of his native France,
King Philip signed Nueva Planta (New Order) decrees for Valencia and
Aragon in 1707, Mallorca and the Balearic Islands in 1715, and finally,
Catalonia in 1716. Id. at 355-56.
22 Stephen Jacobson, Law and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century
Europe: The Case of Cataloniain ComparativePerspective, 20 LAW & HIST.
REv. 307, 309 (2002).
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public law," and forbade the use of the Catalan language in all legal
and official matters.23
Over the next century, although Catalan law and politics
remained subjugated to the royal seat in Madrid, the independent
spirit of the people of Catalonia never extinguished. The early
nineteenth century saw the emergence of the Renaixenga, a cultural
movement inspired by the currents of European Romanticism that
sought to resurrect Catalan language and tradition, primarily through
a revival of its literature and historical narrative. 24 Through poetry,
literature, and theater; writers like Bonaventura Carles Aribau,
Manuel Mild i Fontanals, and Jacint Verdaguer sought to venerate the
old Catalan ways while preserving them for future generations. 25 By
the time Catalan General Juan Prim led the Glorious Revolution that
removed Queen Isabella II in 1868, the Renaixenga movement had
developed the clear ideological desire to regain Catalonian autonomy
within the framework of a unified Spain. 26
This newfound political will reached a high watermark in the
1931 national elections as the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya

(ERC) party gained control of Catalonia's political machine on a
platform of reestablishing Catalonian independence.27 That same
id
24 See La Renaixenga (The Catalan Cultural Renaissance),
LLETRA,
23

http://www.1letra.net/en/period/la-renaixenca (last visited June 20, 2014).
25 Aribau published the poem La PAitria in 1833, which
is widely
acknowledged as the inception of the Renaixenga movement. Id Manuel
Mild i Fontanals was another highly influential figure who contributed to the

movement as a linguist, philologist, and literary scholar. See Josep Mids i
Mids, Manuel Mild i Fontanals, ASS'N CATALAN LANGUAGE WRITERS,

http://www.escriptors.cat/autors/milaifontanalsm/pagina.php?id sec=3793
(last visited June 20, 2014). For his part, Verdaguer is renowned for writing
the Catalan national epic, Canig6 (1886). See Jacint Verdaguer, LLETRA,
http://www.Iletra.net/en/author/jacint-verdaguer/detail (last visited June 20,
2014).
26 In 1866, Prim led a rebellion at San Gil barracks in Madrid, which
prompted a widespread revolt by the military leaders against the reigning
Isabella II. PAYNE, supranote 20, at 463-64. The beleaguered queen left for
exile in Paris in 1868, and revolutionary leaders eventually replaced her with
an Italian prince, Amadeo of Savoy, in 1870. Id..
27

See Republican Left of Catalonia,ESQUERRA REPUBLICANA, http://ww

w.esquerra.cat/language/english

(last visited June 20, 2014).

Esquerra

Republicanade Catalunya is Catalan for "Republican Left of Catalonia." Id.
Repressed during Franco's dictatorship, the ERC began to regain power with
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year, the newly minted Spanish Republic partially granted the ERC's
wish by recognizing Catalonia's right to self-government-including
a proprietary parliament, president, and prime minister-but stopped
short of offering the total autonomy that the party sought.28
Unfortunately, even these restorative measures proved fleeting as an
uprising led by General Francisco Franco in 1936 initiated the
Spanish Civil War, which dovetailed into an oppressive dictatorship
In 1939, when Franco's
spanning the next four decades.29
administration unilaterally abolished the outgoing Republic's
recognition of Catalonia's autonomy and proclaimed Castilian the
official language of the state, Catalonia once again found itself in a
state of cultural repression-this time even more severe than the
century of the Nueva Planta.30

B.

CATALONIANAUTONoMY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1978

Ultimately, the Francoist regime ended with Franco's death in
1975, and leaders of the emergent Spanish democracy sought to

the initiation of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. See id. Today, the ERC is
the primary political sponsor of the Catalan separatist movement. See
Augusti Colomines, Representing Catalan National Identity. Catalonia
During the Spanish Second Republic and the Civil War, 2008 J. CATALAN

STUD. 65, 67-73.
28

Colomines, supra note 27, at 67-70. The Second Spanish Republic

began in April 1931 when anti-monarchists swept elections throughout Spain
and declared a new republic, prompting King Alfonso XIII to depart for exile
in Rome. See id at 65-67. By December, the provisional government had
approved a new Spanish Constitution, which generally provided "for full
civil liberties and representative rights." PAYNE, supra note 20, at 632.
Unfortunately, the new constitution included significantly anti-Catholic
provisions, a point of contention that soon helped bring about the Civil War
and the
29 rapid demise of the Republic. See id. at 632-43.
See PAYNE, supra note 20, at 684-97.
30 At the end of the Civil War, Franco's regime killed thousands
of
political opponents throughout Spain, while many others fled into exile. See
Conxita Mir, The FrancoistRepression in the Catalan Countries, I CATALAN
HIST. REv. 133, 134-36 (2008). Further, the official ban on dialects other
than Castilian extended to all government, legal, and commercial matters, as

well as schools, shop advertisements, and road signs. See id at 143. In
many Catalan towns, citizens ceased to speak Catalan entirely other than in
their own homes. See id.
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balance a policy of centralism 3' with the strong territorial and cultural
identities of Catalonia and other historically self-governing regions. 32
In an attempt to find a middle ground, the Constitution of 1978
declared its foundation to be in "the indissoluble unity of the Spanish
Nation, [and] the common and indivisible homeland of all
Spaniards," while concurrently guaranteeing "the right to selfgovernment of the nationalities and regions of which it is
composed."3 3 Despite this uncomfortable paradox at the heart of the
new government's charter, Catalan nationalists took some
consolation in the constitution's promise to "[p]rotect all Spaniards
and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their culture
and traditions, languages and institutions."34
The new constitutional framework recognized seventeen such
nationalities and regions, termed "Autonomous Communities," and it
provided them with two distinct paths to self-governance: a slow

Centralism is defined as "the concentration of power and control" in a
central authority for an organization or political system. Centralism
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionar
y/centralism (last visited June 20, 2014).
32 Along with Catalonia, the Basque Region and Galicia were both
granted statutes of autonomy under the Second Republic and both sought to
reacquire their legal status as autonomous regions under the new
constitution. See Daniele Conversi, The Smooth Transition: Spain's 1978
3

Constitution and the Nationalities Question, 4 NAT'L IDENTITIES, 223, 232

(2002).
3 In Castilian: "La Constituci6n se fundamenta en la indisoluble
unidad de la Naci6n espafiola, patria comhn e indivisible de todos los
espailoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomia de las
nacionalidades y regions que la integran." C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29,
1978, art. 2 (Spain), available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/Lists/
constPDF/Constituci%C3%B3n%2OEspaC3%B Iola%20-%2OTex
to%20consolidado.pdf. For the English translation, see Spanish Constitution
of 1978, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. sec. 2, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/t

ext.jsp?file_id=185360 [hereinafter Spanish Constitution] (last visited June
20, 2014).
34 In Castilian: "Proteger a todos los espahioles y pueblos de Espafia en
el ejercicio de los derechos humanos, sus culturas y tradiciones, lenguas e
instituciones." C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, pmbl. (Spain), available
at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/Lists/constPDF/ConstituciC3%B3n
%20EspaC3%B lola%20-%20Texto%20consolidado.pdf; see also Spanish
Constitution, supra note 33, pmbl.
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track and a fast track. The majority of the communities were bound
to the standard "slow track" provisions of Article 143, which gave
them the right to form a self-governing community.3 6 Under Article
148, after a period of five years, these "slow track" autonomous
communities would be able to negotiate with the central government
to "progressively enlarge their powers within the framework" of
Article 149."
Alternatively, Article 151 provided a "fast track" to selfgovernance for those communities that were qualified as "historical

"s C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 143 (Spain); see also Spanish
Constitution, supra note 33, sec. 143. Spain's recognized autonomous
communities include Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the
Basque Country, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, CastileLe6n, Catalonia, Ceuta, Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid, Melilla,
Murcia, Navarre, and Valencia. See Autonomous Regions, SPAIN.INFO,
http://www.spain.info/en/consultas/ciudades-y-pueblos/comunidades-autono
mas.html (last visited June 20, 2014).
36 Article 143 states:
(1) In the exercise of the right to selfgovernment recognized in section 2 of the
Constitution, bordering provinces with common
historic, cultural and economic characteristics,
insular territories and provinces with a historic
regional status may accede to self-government and
form

Self-governing

Communities

.

.

.

in

conformity with the provisions contained in this
Part and in the respective Statutes.
(2) The right to initiate the process towards
self-government lies with all the Provincial
Councils concerned or with the corresponding interisland body and with two thirds of the
municipalities whose population represents at least
the majority of the electorate of each province or
island. These requirements must be met within six
months from the initial agreement reached to this
aim by any of the local Corporations concerned.
(3) If this initiative is not successful, it may be
repeated only after five years have elapsed.
C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 143 (Spain); see also Spanish
Constitution,supra note 33, sec. 143.
" C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 148 (Spain); see also Spanish
Constitution,supra note 33, sec. 148.
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nationalities" under Article 143 3 -the Basque Country, Catalonia,
and Galicia-with the intention of swiftly restoring them to the
recognized autonomy they had been granted by the Second Spanish
Republic. 39 Taking advantage of the opportunity to recover most of
the rights to self-determination they had lost under Franco, Catalonia
celebrated the passage of its Estatutd'Autonomia in 1979.40
For Catalonia and the other fast-tracked autonomous
communities, the Constitution of 1978 instituted a parliamentary
system41 consisting of an elected Legislative Assembly, a President,

an Executive Council and a High Court of Justice.42 As established
(1) It shall not be necessary to wait for the five-year period
referred to in section 148, subsection 2, to elapse when the
initiative for the autonomy process is agreed upon within the time
limit specified in section 143, subsection 2, not only by the
corresponding Provincial Councils or inter-island bodies, but also
by three-quarters of the municipalities of each province concerned,
representing at least the majority of the electorate of each one, and
38

said initiative is ratified in a referendum by the overall majority of
electors in each province, under the terms to be laid down by an
organic act.
Spanish Constitution, supra note 33, sec. 151; see also C.E., B.O.E. n. 311,
Dec. 29, 1978, art. 151 (Spain).
39 Initially, only Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia were
offered the "fast track" to autonomy under the new constitution, but other
regions were offered later. See Lewis, supra note 5.
40 Under the structure established by the Constitution of 1978, each of

the seventeen autonomous communities in Spain has its own Estatut
d'Autonomia, Catalan for "statute of autonomy," which provides its basic
institutional regulations, including the rights and obligations of its citizens,
its political institutions and their relationship to the rest of Spain, and the
government's financing structure. See C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec 29, 1978,
arts. 143-48 (Spain); see also Spanish Constitution, supra note 33, secs.
143-48.
41 A parliamentary system is a democratic form of government in which
the power to both make and execute laws is held by the parliament (or
legislative) branch. See Parliamentary Government Definition, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parliamentary%20go
vemment (last visited June 20, 2014). This stands in contrast to a

"presidential" system (e.g., the United States), in which the legislative
branch passes laws and the executive branch administers them. As opposed
to a presidential system, the head of state in a parliamentary system is
normally different than the head of government.
42

Article 152 states:
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under Article 152, the Parliament of Catalonia represents the most
powerful branch of government, and it is elected by universal
suffrage through proportional representation of the territory.4 3 The
President of Catalonia, elected and held accountable by the Catalan
Parliament, oversees the Executive Council in the dispatch of its

(1) In the case of Statutes passed by means of
the procedure referred to in the foregoing section,
the institutional self-government organization shall
be based on a Legislative Assembly elected by
universal suffrage under a system of proportional
representation which shall also assure the
representation of the various areas of the territory;
an Executive Council with executive and
administrative functions and a President elected by
the Assembly among its members and appointed by
the King. The President shall assume leadership of
the Executive Council, the supreme representation
of the Community and the State's ordinary
representation in the latter. The President and the
members of the Executive Council shall be
politically accountable to the Assembly.
A High Court of Justice, without prejudice to
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, shall be the
head of Judicial Power in the territory of the Selfgoverning Community. The Statutes of Autonomy
may make provision for the circumstances and the
manner in which the Community is to take part in
the setting-up of the judicial districts of the territory.
Provided that they must conform to the provisions
of the Organic Act on the Judicial Power and to the
principles of unity and independence of the judicial
power.
Without prejudice to the provisions of section
123, successive proceedings, if any, shall be held
before judicial bodies located in the same territory
of the Self-governing Community in which the
Court having jurisdiction in the first instance is
located.
C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29. 1978, art. 152 (Spain); see also Spanish
Constitution,supra note 33, sec. 152.
43 See C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29. 1978, art. 152 (Spain); see also
Spanish Constitution, supra note 33, sec. 152.
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executive and administrative functions.4
The High Court of
Catalonia represents the highest judicial body within the territory,45
but it must function "without prejudice" to Spain's Supreme Court
and must submit to governance by the General Council of the
Judicial Power.46 In Catalonia, this collective body of political
institutions is known as the Generalitat, representing the restoration
of its governing entity of the same name, which was first established
in the thirteenth century.47

44 Once elected by the Legislative Assembly of an autonomous
community, the President of that community must pass through the formality
of official appointment by the King of Spain. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29.

1978, art. 152 (Spain); see also Spanish Constitution, supra note 33, sec.

152.
45 The Tribunal Superior de Justicia (TSJ) is headed by its own
chairman and is divided into three sections: the Civil and Criminal Court

(Sala de lo Civil y Penal), the Contentious Administrative Court (Sala de lo
Contenciosoy Administrativo), and the Labor Court (Sala de lo Social). See
What is the HCJ Catalonia?,PODER JUDICIAL ESPARFA, http://www.poderjudi
cial.es/cgpj/en/Judiciary/HighCourtsof Justice/HCJ Catalonia/Institutiona
I information/What is the HCJ Catalonia (last visited June 21, 2014).
46 The General Council of the Judiciary was established under Article
122 of the Constitution of 1978, and has administrative jurisdiction over all
Spanish courts and judges, including the organization, operation, and internal
functions of the courts. See C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, arts. 122,
152 (Spain); see also Spanish Constitution,supra note 33, secs. 122, 152.
47 Beginning in the end of the thirteenth century, the Generalitatwas an
institution under the Crown of Aragon that governed some administrative
aspects of the Principality of Catalonia. See Beginnings (14th Century),
GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/guia/ant
ecedents/antecedents2.htm (last visited June 20, 2014). Following the rise
and fall of Catalonian autonomy, the Generalitatwas abolished by the Nueva
Planta decree in 1716, restored by the Second Spanish Republic in 1932,
dissolved again by the Francoist regime in 1939, and reinstituted in its

present form under the Constitution of 1978. See Historical Origins,
GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/guia/ant
ecedents/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2014); The Republican Government
of Catalonia,1931-1939, GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, http://www.gencat.

cat/generalitatleng/guia/antecedents/antecedentsl6.htm (last visited June 20,
2014).
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C.

CATALONIAN SEPARATISMIN THE 21ST CENTURY

Since its reinstitution in 1979, the Generalitathas continued to
make strides toward greater self-governance. Catalonia now enjoys
exclusive jurisdiction over the environment, communications,
transportation, commerce, public safety, local government, and many
aspects of culture, while deferring to the central government
regarding education, health, and justice.48 After sharing jurisdiction
with Spain's Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil for decades,
49
Catalonia's proprietary police force, the Mossos d'Esquadra,
assumed full authority for law enforcement in Catalonia in 2008.5o
Finally, while Catalonia is generally subject to the laws of the
Spanish government, its historic civil code survives in certain areas
of law, in particular for purchase and leasing agreements, family law,
and inheritance law.5 '

In 2005, the Catalan Parliament drafted and approved a proposal
to reform its Estatut, which included a provision that would define
Catalonia as a "nation," as opposed to its current status as a
"nationality," along with other expansions of Catalan autonomy.52
After negotiations and amendments in the Cortes Generales,s3 both
48

See generally Title IV. Powers (Articles 110-173), GENERALITAT DE

http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_4.htm (last
visited June 20, 2014) (providing links to the full contents of the Statute of
Autonomy of Catalonia).
49 Initially formed in 1719 as the Esquadres de Catalunya (Catalonian
Squad) to protect Catalonian citizens from crime during the War of the
Spanish Succession, the Mossos d'Esquadra (Squad Lads) is "one of the
CATALUNYA,

oldest civil police forces in Europe." See History of Mossos d'Esquadra,

http://nebur81.jimdo.com/about-mo
ssos-d-esquadral (last visited June 20, 2014).
NEBUR81 POLICE PATCHES COLLECTOR,

'o See id.
" See Catalan Civil Law,

DS

ADVOCATS

I

ECONOMisTES,

(last
http://www.ds-advocats.com/0 12-Droit-Civil-Catalan.html?lang=en
visited June 20, 2014).
52 Along with granting Catalonia "nation"
status, the proposed
amendment to the Estatut gave the Generalitatgreater power over taxation
and judicial matters, as well as increased control over airports, ports, and
immigration.

See Catalonia Endorses Autonomy Plan, BBC NEWS,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5091572.stm (last updated June 19, 2006).
5
The Cortes Generales is the bicameral Parliament of Spain,
consisting of the Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies) and the
Senado (Senate). See CORTES GENERALEs, http://www.cortesgenerales.es/
(last visited June 20, 2014) (translation of site by author).
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houses passed the proposal in May 2006 despite the lack of support
from a divided Catalan Nationalist Party.54 When brought to a
referendum vote in June of that year, the amendment passed easily
with nearly 74% approval, although only 49% of the Catalan
electorate turned out to vote.s While Spain's Prime Minister,
Zapatero, maintained that the Catalan people had "spoken clearly" in
favor of the amendment that would bring "greater recognition of the
identity" of the region,5 6 members of the press concluded that the
lackluster turnout reflected the electorate's disillusion with a slow
and uncertain path to independence, and a Catalan political
leadership it perceived as ineffective in leading it there.5 7
Six years later, fervor for separatism in Catalonia gained
renewed momentum in the wake of Spain's severe economic crisis. 5 8
Ahead of the November 2012 elections, more than one million
citizens took to the streets of Barcelona to demonstrate their desire
for an independent Catalonia. 59 While somewhat fueled by the
historical arguments for independence, including discrimination
against the Catalan language6 o and culture, 61 the demonstrations
ahead of the November 2012 elections indicate that the current wave

54 The ControversialReform of the Statute ofAutonomy ofCatalonia
(2005-2010), AMS. FOR CATALONIA (July 30, 2013), http://americansforcatalo
nia.wordpress.com/2013/07/30/the-controversial-reform-of-the-statute-of-aut

onomy-of-catalonia-2005-2010/.
s5 CataloniaEndorsesAutonomy Plan, supra note 52.
56

id

5 See, e.g., Press Cool on Catalan Vote, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.c

o.uk/2/hi/europe/5094340.stm (last updated June 19, 2006).
58 See Spain's Catalonia Region - Speeding Toward Separation?,
EURONEWS (Sept. 11, 2012, 3:56 PM), http://www.euronews.com/2012/09/11

/spain-s-catalonia-region-speeding-toward-separation/.
5 See Huge Turnout for Catalan Independence Rally, BBC News

(Europe) (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-1956464
0; Raphael Minder, Protest Rally in CataloniaAdds a Worry for Spain, N.Y.

TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012 /09/12/world/europe/
12iht-barcelonal 2.html? r-0.
60

See R.L.G., Catalonian Confusion, EcONOMIST (Nov. 27, 2012, 3:10

PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2012/I l/language-and-natio
nalism.
61See, e.g., Matthew Tree, Life on the Receiving End: A Subjective Look
at Anti-Catalan Prejudice in Spain, I BYE BYE SPAIN?, Fall 2010, available

at http://www.it-intransit.eu/sites/default/files/IT2010_01_fullissue.pdf.
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of Catalan separatism is focused on economic and political factors.62
Catalan nationalists argue that though they represent one of the most
prosperous regions of the country, thereby funding a large portion of
Spain's government through their tax contributions, they are "shortchanged" on the return of those funds through government spending
Making matters worse, the
to the tune of E16 billion per year.
current economic crisis has battered Catalonia with a 22%
unemployment rate coupled with significant cutbacks in health and
education programs due to current national austerity measures. 4
The result of this groundswell has been a push for a referendum
on Catalan independence in 2014 championed by the current
president of the Generalitat,Arturo Mas.6 5 However, Spanish Prime
Minister, Rajoy, has unswervingly maintained that any such
referendum is illegal due to the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish
In
nation" referred to in Article 2 of the Constitution of 1978.
September 2013, Mas affirmed that he is "absolutely determined" to
bring the referendum to a vote in Catalonia, with or without Madrid's
approval.

II. THE RULE OF LAW, CORRUPTION, AND CATALONIA
In the highly connected global community of the twenty-first
century, there is a renewed recognition of the necessity of nation-

62 See Spain's Catalonia Region - Speeding Towards Separation?,
supra note 58.
63 See
id.
6 Id.
65 The Catalan President: "The Referendum Will Happen,"
CATALAN

(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.catalannewsagency.com
AGENCY
politics/item/mas-the-referendum-will-happen.
66 C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art 2 (Spain); see also
Spanish
NEWS

Constitution, supra note 33, sec. 2; Lewis, supra note 5.
67 The CatalanPresident: "The Referendum Will Happen," supra note

65. Mas has suggested that if he cannot come to an agreement with Spain's
government on a referendum for Catalan independence, he will turn the 2016
general elections into a "plebiscite-style" vote on independence. Id
Members of the opposition party in Catalonia (the ERC) and other senior
separatist leaders rejected this idea due to a concern that two years is too
long to wait. Id.
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building for new or developing states. Under today's paradigm of a
nascent government, the key to long-term development and conflict
prevention is

a

state that can govern

well.69

International

governmental bodies, private foundations, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) collectively invest billions each year to assist
emerging nations, 70 with the humanitarian aim of improving the wellbeing of their citizens and the self-interested goal of reducing the
negative spillover effects that a new state's failure could have on
global stability and security.
In general terms, "the rule of law" is the authority and influence
of law in a community, particularly as a constraint upon individual
and institutional behavior, and is affected by factors such as
government corruption, access to justice, enforcement of laws, and
human rights.72

68 Madalene O'Donnell, Corruption:A Rule of Law Agenda?, in CIvIL
WAR AND THE RULE OF LAW: SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS 225,

226 (Agn6s Hurwitz & Reyko Huang eds., 2008).
69

id

70

Orderin the Jungle, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2008, at 83-85.

"
72 See id
See, e.g., Rule ofLaw Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.me

rriam-webster.com/dictionary/ruleoflaw (last visited June 20, 2014). While
definitions of the rule of law range widely, this note will pay special
attention to the rule of law framework provided by the World Justice Project
(WJP) as defined in the Rule of Law Index 2012-2013. See MARK DAVID
AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2012-

2013, at 3 (2013) [hereinafter WJP INDEX 2012-2013], available at
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJPIndexReport_2012.pd
f. According to the WJP:
[T]he rule of law refers to a system in which the
following four universal principles are upheld:

I. The government and its officials and agents as well as
individuals and private entities are accountable under the
law.
II. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just, are
applied evenly, and protect fundamental rights, including
the security of persons and property.
III. The process by which the laws are enacted,
administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and
efficient.
IV. Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and
independent representatives and neutrals who are of
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Almost universally, the rule of law is regarded as a good unto
itself and a cause of other positive trends, such as social
advancement, and strong political participation. The World Justice
Project maintains that establishing the rule of law is essential for any
emerging nation that hopes to achieve "sustainable economic
development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental
rights." 74
While the international community now recognizes that the
effective implementation of the rule of law plays a vital role in any
new nation's success, there is also a broad consensus that "the degree
of corruption within that state can fundamentally alter whether laws
lift people up or . .. pull them under."7 Corruption is an expansive
term that may refer to a wide range of behaviors from lower-level
"administrative" corruption, such as bribery of a mid-level
bureaucrat, to "grand" corruption, such as a large corporation's
promise of campaign financing to a national legislator to gain
The World Justice
influence over policy at the highest level.
Project broadly characterizes corruption as "the use of public power
for private gain," and-more specifically-as "a manifestation of the
extent to which government officials abuse their power or fulfill their
Corruption is typically thought to
obligations under the law."7
involve a monetary exchange, but its currency can be more insidious,
such as a promise of future favor, an offer to secure a tenured job for
a friend or family member, or a pledge of political support from a
powerful interest group. 78
Transparency International79 contends that more extreme forms
of corruption can lead to "the capture of the state itself, whereby
sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect
the makeup of the communities they serve.
Id.
7
74

75
7
77

See Order in the Jungle,supra note 70.
WJP INDEx2012-2013, supra note 72, at 1.

O'Donnell, supranote 68.
Id. at 225.

Absence of Corruption,WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproj
ect.org/factors/absence-of-corruption (last visited June, 21, 2014).
78

TRANSPARENCY INT'L,

STRATEGY 2015

7 (2011),

available at

http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/tistrategy_2015?e=2496456
/2708726.
79 Transparency International (TI) is a leading non-governmental
organization in the fight against corruption. From its headquarters in Berlin,
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powerful individuals, institutions, companies, or groups use [it] to

shape a whole nation's policies, legal environment and economy to
serve their own private interests."8 0 Other critics have asserted that
widespread government corruption can effectively "derail political
and economic transitions, undermine state capacity and legitimacy,
exacerbate poverty, and inflame grievances linked to conflict."', As
one commentator pointed out: "Corruption undermines both state
effectiveness (the ability to govern) and state legitimacy (the
recognition of the right to govern). While effectiveness may matter
over time, legitimacy is essential for sustaining fragile states that are
not yet effective." 82
From the global economic community's perspective, the degree
of corruption within a state reflects the health of its government's
relationship with domestic business interests as well as its
susceptibility to undue influence from international sources.83 In the
late twentieth century, the consensus among economists was that in
order for new states to grow, it was essential for them to "get the
policies right" on matters like national budgeting and exchange
84
rates.4
However, the collapse of the Asian markets in the late
nineties and the financial difficulties of former Soviet states that had
the "right" policies in place caused analysts to reexamine their
thinking.85 Today, international economists place a greater focus on
the "institutional setting of policymaking" and in particular, the rule
of law, with the understanding that "[i]f the rules of the game [are] a
mess, ... no amount of tinkering with macroeconomic policy w[ill]
produce the desired results."86 At the same time, economic experts
recognize that without effective efforts to control corruption, "wellconnected" politicians and individuals in developing countries will
often capitalize on the opportunity to "grab an unfair share of the
TI presently works in over 100 countries to raise awareness of the damaging
effects of corruption and directs them to work with partners in government,
business, and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to
address corruption. See Who We Are, TRANSPARENCY INT'L http://ww

w.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation (last visited June 21, 2014).
80 TRANSPARENCY INT'L,

supra note 77, at 7.

81O'Donnell, supra note 68, at 225.
8 Id at 227.
81 See id. at 229.
84 Order in the Jungle, supra note
85 Id
86 Id

70.
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spoils of growth."8 Left unchecked, these elements of corruption
will ultimately slow-or even reverse-economic growth by
discouraging outside investment.
In light of the current consensus on its effect on nation-building
and economic development, corruption represents a force that could
significantly disrupt Catalonia's potential success as an independent
nation. Corruption in Spain degrades the rule of law for citizens in
present-day Catalonia on two fronts. On one hand, the Catalans'
frustration that the dishonesty of national politicians contributed to
the current financial crisis fuels their distrust of the central
government and thereby emboldens their desire for independence.
On the other hand, evidence of corruption among Catalan
representatives redirects that cynicism toward their own political
institutions and thereby undermines the "legitimacy" and
"effectiveness" of their current subnational government.89 Were
Catalonia to achieve independence, this dynamic could have a
significant impact on its success or failure as a new state. 90

A.

CA TALONIA 'S ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

In present-day Catalonia, a tapestry of national, subnational, and
international laws and institutions regulate corruption." Until the
establishment of the Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia in 2008, there
was no consolidated strategy to fight corruption; consequently, the
Spanish Parliament and the Parliament of the Generalitatpassed anticorruption laws on an ad hoc basis.92 In addition, European and other
international bodies have added further layers of anti-corruption law
93
that have affected efforts in Spain and Catalonia in recent years.

87

id

18

See id.

89 See

O'Donnell, supra note 68, at 227.

90 See id.

91 See Profiles: Catalonia, Spain, ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITIES,

(last updated Sept. 2012).
https://www.acauthorities.org/country/es
92
93

See id.
See infra, Parts I.A.4-6.
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1. National Laws
The national anti-corruption framework was initiated by Ley
53/1984 de 26 de diciembre, which defines a prohibition against
conflicts of interest for all government employees.9 4 With Ley
30/1992 de 26 de noviembre, the Parliament of Spain established the

legal regime for the administration and the procedure of all
government bodies, which also includes a duty to abstain from
intervening in any proceeding in which they have a conflict of
interest.
Under this law, if a government employee "[has] a
personal interest in the subject at hand or in another which could be
influenced by the outcome of the current proceeding," that employee
must immediately abstain from further intervention in the proceeding
and communicate the conflict of interest to his immediate superior. 96
In addition, a government worker must abstain from a matter if he
has worked for "any natural person or legal entity with a direct
interest in the subject" within the previous two years.97
In Ley 7/2007 de 12 de abril, the Cortes Generales9 8 provides

the basic statute for the duties of all public employees, including an
obligation to perform all functions with a spirit of "equality,
objectivity and transparency." 99 Similar rules on conflicts of interest
94 Ley de incompatibilidades del personal al servicio de las
Administraciones Publicas [Law on the Incompatibilities of Personnel in the
Service of Public Administration] (B.O.E. 1985), available at
http://noticias.juridicas.com/base datos/Admin/153-1984.html (translation by

author); see also Profiles: Catalonia,Spain, supra note 91.
95 Ley de R6gimen Juridico de las Administraciones P~iblicas y del
Procedimiento Administrativo Comun [Law on the Judicial Regime of Public
Administration and of Common Administrative Procedure] art. 28 (B.O.E.
1992, 285), available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/base datos/Admin/130-

1992.t2.html (translation by author); see also Profiles: Catalonia, Spain,
supra note 91.
96 Such conflict explicitly includes having a blood relation of the fourth
degree, or an "intimate friendship or manifest enmity" with any interested
party, including the administrators of any related entity or organization with
an interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Law on the Judicial Regime of
Public Administration and of Common Administrative Procedure art.
28(2)(a) (B.O.E. 1992, 285), available at http://noticias.juridicas.com
/base datos/ Admin/130-1992.t2.html (translation by author).
q Id. art. 28(2)(e).
98 Cortes Generales means "Parliament of Spain." See supra, note 53.
99 Ley del Estatuto Bisico del Empleado Publico [Law of the Basic
Statute of the Public Employee] (B.O.E 2007, 89), available at
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for all regional governments are provided for under Ley 5/2006 de 10
de abril. 0o

2.

Regional Laws

At the subnational level, the Generalitathas enacted its own legal
regime to fight corruption. The code of duties and responsibilities
for the Catalan Parliament are provided by Decreto Legislativo
0
which deems it a "very grave" offense
1/1997 de 31 de octubre,o'
for any member of Parliament to "violate neutrality or political
independence" in any form.102 In 2005, the Spanish Parliament also
approved a Code of Good Governance for the members of all
regional governments with the express purpose of "avoiding any
activity or interest that could compromise their independence or
impartiality, or diminish the performance of their public duties."' 0 3
In 1987, the Ley 21/1987 de 26 de noviembre established the
regulatory scheme for incompatibilities and conflicts of interest in
Catalonia. 104 With a predominantly fiscal perspective, the law

http://noticias.juridicas.com/basedatos/Admin/17-2007.html. (translation by
author)
100 See Ley de regulaci6n de los conflictos de intereses de los miembros
del Gobierno y de los Altos Cargos de la Administraci6n General del Estado
[Law of the Regulation of the Conflicts of Interest of Members of the
Government and the High Charges of the General Administration of the
State] tit. II (B.O.E 2006, 86), available at http://noticiasjuridicas.com/ba
se datos/Admin/15-2006.html (translation by author).
101See Decreto por el que se aprueba la refundici6n en un texto 6nico de
los preceptos de determinados textos legales vigentes en Catalufia en materia
de funci6n pliblica [Revision of the Precepts of Legal Duties of Public
Functionaries in Catalonia] (D.O.G.C. 1997), availableat http://noticias.jurid
icas.com/basedatos/CCAAlca-dlegl -1997.html (translation by author).
102 Id. at art. 115(g) (translation by author).
103 Orden por el se aprueba el C6digo de Buen Gobiemo
de los
miembros del Gobierno y de los altos cargos de la Administraci6n General
del Estado [Order for the Approval of the Code of Good Governance of the
Members of the Government and of High Positions of the General
Administration of the State] (B.O.E 2005, 56), availableat http://noticias.ju
ridicas.com/base datos/Admin/o5 16-2005-apu.html (translation by author).
'0 See Ley de incompatibilidades del personal al servicio de la
Administraci6n de la Generalidad [Law on Incompatibilities of the Personnel
in Service of the Administration of the Government of Catalonia] (D.O.G.C.
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established obligations upon members of the Catalan government to
ensure their "independence, impartiality and objectivity" in all of
their functions.1 0 5

3.

The Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia

In 2008, with the passage of Acto 14/2008 de 5 de noviembre, the
Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia (Oficina) was instituted in Barcelona
to prevent and investigate corruption within the Catalan territory.1 06
While its Director ultimately reports to the Catalan Parliament, the
Anti-Fraud Office was expressly established as an institution
possessing its own legal personality, acting independently of other
government departments in the exercise of its authority.' 0 7 As
1987, 923), availableat http://noticias.juridicas.com/basedatos/CCAA/ca-12
1-1987.html (translation by author).
1os Id. at Exposici6n de Motivos [Explanation of Motives] (translation
by author).
106 See Act 14/2008 of November 5th, on the Anti-Fraud Office
of
Catalonia pmbl. (D.O.G.C. 2008), availableat http://www.antifrau.cat/image
s/stories/documentos/NormativaReguladora/eng/engACT ontheAntiFra
udOffice of Catalonia.pdf. The Act also provides that:
The sphere of action of the Anti-Fraud Office
of Catalonia is the public sector of Catalonia, made up of
the government of the Generalitat, the local entities and
the public universities, including in all cases their bodies
and associated entities and public companies that report
to them. In relation to the local entities and public
universities, the [Office] acts in compliance with the
principles of local and university autonomy guaranteed
under the Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of
Catalonia.
Id sec. 2.1.
107 The Oficina's independence as its own legal entity further fulfills the
mandate of Article 6 of the UNCAC, which provides that
[e]ach State Party shall grant the body . . .
referred

to

. . . the necessary

independence,

in

accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal
system, to enable the body . . . to carry out its . . .

functions effectively and free from any undue influence.
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, G.A. Res.
58/4, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 6, 1 2 (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC],
availableat https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications
/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
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Catalonia's leading anti-corruption body, the Oficina works to
enhance the "establishment, the implementation, and the
modification of . . . regulatory frameworks" by "promoting social

values" that it hopes will stand as "obstacles to the emergence of [an
uncritical] and resigned acceptance of corrupt practices" and stands
as a constant guard against those that demonstrate a lack of integrity
within the public and private sectors. 08 In its investigative role, the
Oficina is charged with making inquiry into cases of corruption
punishable by "administrative penalty or criminal conviction," which
it then brings to the attention of either the judiciary or public
prosecutor.' 0 9
Since its foundation in 2009, the Anti-Fraud Office's functions
have included formal meetings with other national, regional, and
international institutions to discuss initiatives and policies that
address corruption." 0 Each year, the director and his staff visit
corresponding anti-corruption offices throughout the world in
addition to attending a full slate of conferences held by bodies such
as the European Forum on Anti-Corruption, the International
Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA), and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)."'
While international forums have enhanced the Oficina's
foundational knowledge and strategy, its primary work occurs within
Catalonia. The Oficina regularly contributes to the legislative
process through regulatory initiatives related to the prevention of
corruption. 112 In order to safeguard its institutional neutrality and

108 Functions, OFICINA
ANTIFRAU
DE CATALUNYA,
http://www.antifrau.cat/enla-institucio/functionsen.html (last visited June
20, 2014).
109 d.
l'
See Agenda, OFICINA ANTIFRAU DE CATALUNYA,
https://www.antifrau.cat/en/activitat-internacionalen/ 167-visites-institucional

s-de-loficina-antifrau-de-catalunya-a-paris.html (last visited June 20, 2014).
11 See id.
112 See ANTI-FRAuD OFFICE OF CATALONIA, ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2009)
[hereinafter ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT], availableat http://www.
antifrau.cat/images/stories/documentos/documents_pdf/memoria_2009/Mem
oria_2009 ang web.pdf.
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independence, the Oficina makes its recommendations by testimony
during the public information phase of regulatory creation." 3
In addition, the Oficina provides anti-corruption training of
public servants, both in Catalonia and in other regions of Spain.114
Representatives coordinate on-the-job anti-corruption training in
public and private offices as well as programs for students attending
the School of Public Administration of Catalonia, the Judicial Law
College, and various universities throughout Spain." 5 Finally, the
Oficina conducts studies and data collection projects with the
purpose of understanding the scope of corruption within Catalonia
and discerning the best methods for confronting it." 6
The creation of the Oficina represented a fulfillment of Article 6
of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC),
which exhorts its signatory parties to establish specialized and
independent entities to prevent and investigate corruption." 7 It is of
note that while it is Spain who is a party to the UNCAC, and not
Catalonia, the Oficina is seated in Barcelona and has the primary
responsibility of regulating corruption in the Catalan territory.
Therefore, the creation and function of the Oficina arguably falls
short of fulfilling Spain's mandate under Article 6 of the UNCAC
and the Oficina has done less than it might have to cure what ails
Spain's national anti-corruption framework as Catalonia is not the
only Spanish territory ridden with corruption .118 On the other hand,
a February 2014 report by the European Commission on anticorruption efforts in the EU applauds the Anti-Fraud Office of
Catalonia for "achiev[ing] a solid track-record of investigations and
113 See id.
"4 See id at 33-34.
115See id.
6
" See id. at 36-37.
"1 See id., art. 6.1. The relevant text of Article 6 states:

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental
principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or
bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption by such means as:
(a) Implementing the policies referred to in . . . this

Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and
coordinating the implementation of those policies;
(b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the
prevention of corruption.
Id

118See id; see also supra, note 106 and accompanying text.
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prosecutions, including in high-level cases involving allegations of
complex schemes of illegal party funding."' 1 9

4.

European Union Law

As a member of the European Union (EU), Spain and its
territories are also subject to EU laws and treaties governing the
codes and duties of public officials.1 20 In May 1997, Spain signed
the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials
of Member States of the European Union, which requires that all
member states take necessary measures to make acts of corruption
criminal offenses punishable by "effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties."'21
On May 10, 2005, Spain signed on to both the Criminall 22 and
Civil 23 Law Conventions on Corruption established by the Council
of Europe.124 When first introduced in 1999, these conventions
ll Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament:EUAnti-CorruptionReport, at 14, COM (2014) 38 final (Feb. 3,
2014) [hereinafter EU Anti-Corruption Report], available at http://ec.euro

pa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-hu
man-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_201 4en.pdf.
120 See Application of EU Law, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/e
u law/index en.htm (last updated Mar. 31, 2014).
121 Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of
the European Communities or Officials of the Member States of the
European Union art. 5, May 26, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 12, availableat http://eur-le
x.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C: 1997:195:0001:0011 :EN:
PDF.
122 See generally Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27,
1999, C.E.T.S. No. 173, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Tr
eaties/Html/173.htm.
123 See generally Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999,
C.E.T.S. No. 174, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/174.htm.
124

Criminal Law Convention on Corruption: Chart of Signatures and

Ratification, COUNCIL EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/Cher
cheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (last updated May 5, 2014);
Civil Law Convention on Corruption: Chart of Signatures and Ratfications,
COUNCIL EUR. (last updated June 12, 2013), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty

/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=1 74&CM=8&DF=06/12/2013&CL=ENG.
Spain also signed on to the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption on May 27, 2009. Additional Protocol to the
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indicated the EU members' recognition of the significant threat of
corruption to the rule of law and the "importance of strengthening
international co-operation in the fight against" it.125 The Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption establishes clear guidelines for the
criminalization of corruption and for the international collaboration
in its prosecution.1 26 For its part, the Civil Law Convention on
Corruption "attempt[s] to define common international rules" for
corruption under civil law and specifically "requires states to provide
legal remedies . . . for persons who [suffer] damage[s]" resulting

from corruption. 127
In addition, Article 14 of the Civil Law
Convention established the Group of States Against Corruption
(GRECO), which is an EU body responsible for monitoring the
member states' compliance with the Criminal and Civil Conventions
on Corruption as well as future EU anti-corruption instruments.' 28

Criminal Law Convention on Corruption: Chart of Signatures and
Ratification, COUNCIL EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/Cher
cheSig.asp?NT=191&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (last updated June 2, 2014).
The Additional Protocol expands the scope of the Convention to include
bribery of domestic and foreign arbitrators and jurors. See Additional
Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, May 15, 2003,
C.E.T.S. No. 191, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/191.htm.
125 Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 123, at pmbl.;
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 122, pmbl. ("Believing
that an effective fight against corruption requires increased, rapid and wellfunctioning international co-operation in criminal matters.").
126 See Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention and Protocol on
Corruption,TRANSPARENCY INT'L ARCHIVE SITE, http://archive.trans
parency.org/globalpriorities/intemationalconventions/conventions instrum
ents/coe criminallaw (last visited June 20, 2014).
127 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption,
TRANSPARENCY INT'L ARCHIVE SITE, http://archive.transparency.

org/global_priorities/intemational conventions/conventions instruments/coe
civil law (last visited June 20, 2014).
1 8 See Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 123, art. 14
("The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) shall monitor the
implementation of this Convention by the Parties."); Council ofEurope Civil
Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 127.
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United Nations Convention Against Corruption

In September 2005, Spain became a signatory to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), both as a nation
and as a member of the European Union. 129 Similar to the EU
criminal and civil anti-corruption conventions, the UNCAC focuses
on the prevention and criminalization of corrupt acts and practices,
international cooperation, and legal measures.' 30 In addition, the
UNCAC provides model preventative policies such as
recommendations that signatory nations institute independent anticorruption entities13 1 and enact laws that promote greater
transparency in the financing of political parties and election
The Convention also represents a significant
campaigns.132
development in the area of legal remedies, which it terms "asset
recovery."l 33 Article 51 provides legal and procedural means by
which illicit assets, that were moved to another country for
protection, may be recovered by a state or a private party through
international cooperation.134

6.

OECD Convention on Combating Bribery

As a founding member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD),1 35 Spain has committed
itself to international policies that recognize economic
interdependence and a global standard for public and private business
In December 1997, Spain signed the OECD's
transactions.13 6
See United Nations Convention Against Corruption Signature and
Ratification Status as of 2 April 2014, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS &
CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last
visited June 20, 2014).
129

130
'

See UNCAC, supra note 107, pmbl.
Id. art. 6.

13 2 See id. arts. 14, 15.
133 Id. pmbl.
134 See id. art. 51, 52.

us See List of OECD Member Countries - Ratification of the
Convention on the OECD, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION & DEv., http:

//www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconvent
ionontheoecd.htm (last visited June 20, 2014).
136

See History,

ORG.

FOR EcONOMIC

CO-OPERATION

& DEV.,

http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited June 20, 2014). In 1961,
Spain joined seventeen other European nations, the United States, and
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Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention),' 3 7
which entered into force within all Spanish territories in March
2000.138 The primary thrust of the Anti-Bribery Convention is a
requirement that each of its signatories implement laws that
criminalize the act of bribing a foreign public official.139 Though the
OECD retains no authority to enforce the Convention, it utilizes a

Canada to form the OECD, which was born out of the previous Organization
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was established in 1948
to carry out the post-World War II reconstruction of Europe under the
Marshall Plan. See id.
137 Org. for Economic Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in InternationalBusiness
Transactions(Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter OECD Convention], availableat
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBriberyENG.pdf.
The
treaty was signed in December 1997 and came entered into force in February
15, 1999. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the
Convention, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.

org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/oecdanti-briberyconventionentryi
ntoforceoftheconvention.htm (last visited June 2, 2014). As of April 2014,
forty nations have ratified and implemented the Convention, most recently
Columbia and the Russian Federation in 2012. See OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in InternationalBusiness
Transactions: Ratification Status as of 8 April 2014, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION & DEv., http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificati
onStatus May20l4.pdf (last updated Apr. 8, 2014) [hereinafter OECD
Ratification Status]. According to the OECD, it is the "first and only
international anti-corruption instrument focused on the 'supply side' of the
bribery transaction." OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in InternationalBusiness Transactions,ORG. FOR ECONOMIC

Co-OPERATION & DEv., http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconv
ention.htm (last visited June 20, 2014).
138See OCED Ratification Status, supra note 137.
139 See OECD Convention, supra note 137, art. 1,
I
Each Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under
its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or
give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public
official .

.

. in order that the official act or refrain from

acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in
order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business.
Id.
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two-phase examination process to monitor implementation of the
related laws: first, by reviewing and evaluating the adequacy of the
legislation and second, by following up to assess the legislation's
effectiveness. 140

B.

RECENT ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN SPAIN

While the layering of subnational, national, EU, and
international law provides a substantial legal framework for the
prevention and eradication of corruption within Spain, recent
assessments by international organizations have pointed out
significant weaknesses that leave Spain's central, regional, and local
governments vulnerable to corruption. In the last two years, reports
by the World Justice Project, Transparency International, and the
OECD collectively suggest that the current legal and governmental
institutions in Spain are significantly lacking in the prevention and
investigation of corruption in many forms.

1. The World Justice Project
The World Justice Project's 2012-2013 Rule of Law Index (WJP
Index) ranked Spain ninth out of sixteen Western European nations
that were evaluated for the absence of corruption.14 1 This result
represents a slight improvement over Spain's marks for corruption in
the previous WJP Index, when it ranked eleventh among the twelve
European peers evaluated. 14 2 Specifically, the World Justice Project
OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 13
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconven
available
(2009),
tion/44033641.pdf.
The WJP
141 See WJP INDEx 2012-2013, supra note 72, at 139.
publishes an annual quantitative assessment "of the extent to which countries
adhere to the rule of law . . . in practice." Id. at 2. The WJP examines "48
rule of law indicators organized around nine conceptual dimensions: limited
government powers; absence of corruption; order and security; fundamental
rights; open government; regulatory enforcement; civil justice; criminal
justice; and informal justice." Id. at 1. Project administrators compile data
by administering pointed questions to a representative sample of the general
public and local experts and by analyzing and crosschecking the results with
a rigorous triangulation methodology. See id. at 12.
140 See

142 MARK DAVID ARGAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF
LAW INDEX, at 95 (2011), available at http://worldjusticeproject.org /sites/def
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has assessed that the Spanish government is still lacking in the
prevention of corruption in the Legislative Branch, as well as in its
civil justice system.143

2.

Transparency International

In a similar vein, Transparency International's (TI) most recent
evaluation of the Spanish political system suggests that conditions
are ripe for corruption in all three major branches of government, as
well as the areas of campaign financing and lobbying.144 Throughout
the report, TI refers to the dominating influence of the two major
political parties in Spain 145-the liberal Partido Socialista Obrero
Espailol (PSOE) and the conservative Partido Popular(PP).146 The
report points out that in Spain's legislative branch, because the PSOE
and PP leaders-rather than the Spanish citizenry-effectively
decide if members of Parliament (MPs) stay on the party list of
acceptable candidates, the MPs' greater loyalty is "to their party
leaders than to their constituency."l 47 This emphasis on party loyalty
effectively limits an MP's independent vote and discourages
ault/files/WJP Rule of Law Index 2011_Report.pdf. Each year, the World
Justice Project expands the Rule of Law Index to include scores for more
countries. In the 2010 WJP Index, Spain ranked sixth out of seven Western
European nations evaluated regarding absence of corruption. MARK DAVID
ARGAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2010, at
84 (2010), availableat http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_

Rule ofLawIndex 2010_Report.pdf.
143 See THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEx, at 60 (2014),
availableat http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjpruleof
law index_2014_report.pdf. While the Rule of Law Index does not cite
particular flaws or offer specific recommendations, its quantitative
assessment provides the subject nations with benchmarks from which they
can focus efforts toward improvement. See Id. at 1, 11.
' See Corruption by Country/Territory: Spain, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://www.transparency.org/country#ESP (last visited June 20, 2014).

145 Id. The Transparency International report points to a 2010 survey in

which Spanish citizens most often chose the political parties as "the
institution most affected by corruption." Id.
14 6 See Spain - PoliticalParties,NSD EUR. ELECTION DATABASE,
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european electiondatabase/country/spain/parties.htm
I (last visited June 20, 2014) (listing and explaining the Spanish political
parties).
147 Corruptionby Country/Territory:Spain, supra note 144.
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whistleblowing.1 4 8 In TI's view, a system of closed and blocked
voting lists further exacerbated the situation, which reduces public
accountability for the MPs, while increasing the party leaders' ability
to "maintain strong control over the representative bodies on the
national, regional and local level."1 49
As for the Executive Branch, TI asserts that the major political
parties also possess excessive influence over key administrative
bodies.1 5 0 The Spanish Court of Audit (Tribunal de Cuentas), for
example, holds the ultimate responsibility for regulating and
examining government accounting and financial management, as
well as campaign financing and electoral processes.' 5 ' Though the
Tribunal de Cuentas was established as an independent legal
institution, TI maintains that the two major political parties exercise
an unhealthy measure of control over the Court's decisions because
of their power within the political sphere.152 The report concluded
that there now exists a significant backlog of the Tribunal de
Cuentas' supervisory capacity, because the Tribunal de Cuentas is
currently overwhelmed with allegations of corruption and
mishandling of funds.' 5 3
The TI report also expresses concern for Spain's current system
of political and campaign financing.' 54 Although public funds
provide 90% of the political parties' funding, the PSOE and the PP
have become increasingly reliant on bank loans in recent years in
order to take on additional expenses.' 55 TI contends that this
"excessive reliance on the financial sector" led to the politicization of
the Cajas de Ahorros, and ultimately contributed to the recent failure
of the banking system.' 56

148

id.

149

id

1so See id.
'1' See id; Audit Function,TRIBUNAL DE CUENTAS,

http://www.tcu.es/tri
bunal-de-cuentas/en/fiscalizac ion/funcion-de-fiscal izacion/ (last visited June
1,2014).
152See Corruptionby Country/Territory:Spain, supranote 144.
5 See d.
154 See id.
15e
Id.
156see id.
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Finally, TI calls attention to the complete lack of lobbying laws
in Spain.' 57 Though legislation was submitted to Parliament in
March 2012 that would have required Parliament to "register and
control lobby activities," it was ultimately rejected.'58 Currently,
Parliament is reconsidering legislation to regulate lobbying
activities.159

3.

The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

From a global economic standpoint, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)160 recently
expressed concern for the absence of foreign bribery convictions in
Spain.161 Though Spain ostensibly fulfilled its commitment under the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by amending its penal code to make
bribery of a public official a crime in January 2000,162 a December
2012 report by the OECD Working Group on Bribery 63 expressed
15sId.

159 See Civil Society Reacts to the Imminent Regulation of Lobbying in
Spain, ACCESS INFO (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.access-info.org/en/lobbying-t
ransparency/537-lobby-regulation-spain-reaction.
160 In the present day, the OECD works with member nations from its
headquarters in Paris to "promote policies that will improve the economic

and social well-being" of their citizens. About the OECD, ORG. FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited
June 1, 2014).
161See OECD Seriously Concerned by Absence of Foreign Bribery
Convictions in Spain, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Aug. 1,
2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/oecdseriouslyconcemedbyabsen

ceofforeignbriberyconvictionsinspain.htm.
162 Spain published the Organic Act 3/2000 of the 11th of January on
January 12, 2000, which modified its penal code by adding Article 445 to
make bribery of a public official a criminal offense. ORG. FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION & DEv. [OECD], SPAIN: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 1 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/238961
4.pdf. The new law entered into force on February 2, 2000. Id
163The Working Group on Bribery consists of the thirty-four OECD
member nations "plus Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Russia, and
South Africa." OECD Seriously Concerned by Absence of Foreign Bribery
Convictions in Spain, supra note 161. The report was based on an on-site
visit by a Working Group evaluation team including lead experts from Brazil
and Chile and members of the OECD Secretariat. OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT
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"serious concerns that, almost 13 years after the entry into force" of
Spain's anti-foreign bribery law, only seven investigations had been
opened, and thus far no individual or company was ever prosecuted
or sanctioned for the offense.iM
Turning its attention to the current state of Spain's anti-bribery
laws, the Working Group recognized that Spain had addressed the
deficiencies pointed out in the OECD's Phase 2 review through a
2010 amendment that increased the penalties for foreign bribery to
anywhere from two to six years imprisonment, raised fines, and
extended the statute of limitations period to ten years.1 6 1 On the
other hand, the Working Group voiced concerns that a separate law,
which prohibited the bribery of European officials, reflected the same
insufficiencies as the original foreign bribery law; the Working
Group recommended that Spain consolidate the general foreignpublic official and European official anti-bribery laws to remove
- *
*166
inconsistencies.
Finally, the OECD Report recommended that Spain make
another amendment to its 2010 anti-foreign bribery regime to remove
the statute's exclusion of "State owned enterprises" from such
liability.16 1

C.

CORRUPTION AND THE SPANISH CITIZENS

In the years since the global economic crisis began, concerns for
the Spanish government's vulnerability to corruption'6 8 have come to
fruition right before the citizenry's eyes. 69 The Friedrich Naumann
Foundation reported that an estimated 730 elected Spanish politicians

ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN SPAIN 6 (2012)
[hereinafter OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT], available at http://www.oecd.org/daf

/anti-bribery/Spainphase3reportEN.pdf.
6 Id. at 5.
165 Id

166 See id.

167OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT,
168 See supra Part II.B.1-3.

supra note 163, at 5.

169 See, e.g., Anger Mounts over Corruption in Recession-Hit
Spain,
RAw STORY (Jan. 27, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/01/

27/anger-mounts-over-corruption-in-recession-hit-spain/.
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were facing prosecution in corruption cases as of June 2013.170
Suffering under severe austerity measures and unemployment rates
that have resulted in part from fiscal irresponsibility and corruption
by their politicians and national leaders, Spanish citizens have
regularly taken to the streets to demonstrate their anger and
frustration.1
The most infamous example of national party corruption
surfaced in January 2013, when the Madrid-based newspaper, El
Mundo, alleged that former Popular Party Treasurer, Luis Barcenas,
had distributed thousands of euros to party officials. 172 "Construction
firms, insurance companies and anonymous donors" allegedly
provided illicit kickbacks and Barcenas then hid the money in Swiss
bank accounts.173 At the municipal level, judgments were handed
down in October 2013 in Spain's largest-ever corruption trial, which
involved "widespread real estate fraud and bribery," and which
implicated three former mayors, former government officials,
business representatives, and attorneys in Marbella. 174
Even the Spanish royal family has been implicated in this
"culture of corruption."
Princess Cristina's husband, Iiaki
Urdangarin, appeared in court in 2012 to answer allegations of
embezzling public funds paid by regional governments through a
charitable organization he chaired in Mallorca from 2004 to 2006."17
In January 2014, a magistrate judge named the Princess as an official
suspect based on the suspicion that she knew about her husband's

170 The Spanish Slump - PoliticalCrisis and the Needfor Institutional

Reform, FOR DIE FREIHEIT (June 17, 2013), http://fnf-europe.org/2013/06/
17/the-spanish-slump-political-crisis-and-the-need-for-institutional-reform/.
171See id; Corruptionby Country/Territory:Spain, supra note 144.

172 Anger Mounts over Corruptionin Recession-HitSpain, supra note
170.
174 Ciaran Giles, Spanish Court Convicts 53 in
Corruption Trial,

HUFFINGTON PosT (Oct. 4, 2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/huff-wires/20131004/eu-spain-corruption/.
17 Tom Burridge, Why Spain's Princess Christina is in Court, BBC

NEWS (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26047722;
see Anger Mounts over Corruptionin Recession-Hit Spain, supra note 169.
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alleged wrongdoing; she may have even spent some of the proceeds
on personal expenses. 7 6
While Catalan separatists might hope to exploit widespread
outrage with the national government to their advantage, the
Nationalist Party of Catalonia suffered its own major corruption
scandal at the height of the public outcry. 7 7 In November 2012,
allegations surfaced that Oriol Pujol, the Secretary General of the
leading Catalan Nationalist Party, and son of the former President of
the Generalitat, had abused his political influence over "vehicle
inspection center contracts for personal gain" in the millions of
euros.' 7 8 Clearly aware of the potential for damage to the public trust
in his government, Catalan President, Arturo Mas, called a summit of
regional government leaders in February 2013 through which he
officially recognized the recent evidence of corruption as a major
concern for Catalan citizens and vowed to find solutions that would
"clean up" the problem.1 7 9 After a second meeting, the participants
published a document proposing fifty-one specific measures to
address the issues of corruption in Catalonia, including greater
transparency in the salaries of public officials, internal audits by
political parties, and greater resources for the courts investigating

176

Burridge, supra note 175; Spain's Princess Christina in Court over

CorruptionCase, BBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/w
orld-europe-26094035.
177

See Tom Clarke, El Mundo's CorruptionAllegations - A November

Surprise, THEBADRASH.COM (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.thebadrash.com/20
12/11/21/el-mundos-corruption-allegations-a-november-surprise/; Prominent
Catalan Politician Charged in Spain Corruption Case, REGIONAL ANTI-

CORRUPTION INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.rai-see.org/news/
world/36 11 -prominent-catalan-politician-charged-in-spain-corruption-case.ht
ml [hereinafter Corruption Case].
1n

Corruption Case, supra note 177. Pujol served as the Secretary

General of the ConvergenciaDemocrctica de Catalunya (CDC). Pere Rios,
Corruption Allegations Surround Catalan Pujol Clan, EL PAIS (Jan. 20,
2013), http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/01/20/inenglish/1358714015_363743.ht

ml.
'n
See Gaspar Pericay Coll, High-Level Meeting in Catalonia to
Improve the Fight Against CorruptionAfter the Latest Scandals, CATALAN
NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/it

em/high-level-meeting-in-catalonia-to-improve-the-fight-against-corruptionafter-the-latest-scandals.
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corruption scandals. 8 0 Further, Mas appeared before a Catalan
Parliament committee in July 2013 to disavow any knowledge of a
connection between his party and the illicit funds from the Pujol
scandal,' 8 ' though many observers concluded that considerable
damage to the Catalan people's trust in their government was already
done.182

III. CORRUPTION AND AN INDEPENDENT CATALONIA
While the realization of an independent Catalonia is far from
certain in such a volatile political and socioeconomic environment,
the question remains whether corruption would "undermine state
capacity and legitimacy" in a newly independent Catalonia and
effectively "derail" the "political and economic transition." 8 3
Although the political consequences of corruption can be "difficult to
quantify," the general consensus is that "growing perceptions of
corruption diminish trust in public institutions."' 84 In a similar vein,
while uncovering corruption is essential to rooting out the problem,
exposing corrupt political institutions and actors can cause further
political destabilization, which is only intensified by "excessive
expectations on the part of both voters and international actors."18 5
Recent reports confirm that the Spanish population has
developed a profound mistrust in its politicians and political parties

iso See The Presidentofthe CatalanGovernment Proposes51 Measures
to Fight Corruption and Increase Transparency, CATALAN NEWS AGENCY
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/the-presid
ent-of-the-catalan-government-proposes-5 1-measures-to-fight-corruption-

and-increase-transparency [hereinafter 51 Measures].
181 The Catalan President Denies Playing Any Part in the 'Palau'
Corruption Case Before a Parliamentary Committee, CATALAN NEWS
AGENCY (July 31, 2013), http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/t
he-catalan-president-denies-playing-any-part-in-the-palau-corruption-case-be
fore-a-arliamentary-committee.
See, e.g., 51 Measures, supra note 180; Corruption Case, supra note
177.
183O'Donnell, supra note 68, at 225.
'8Id at 230.

"sId at 231.
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in recent years.' 8 6 The OECD's How's Life? 2013 Measuring WellBeing report, published in November 2013, confirmed that since the
global financial crisis began in 2007, the number of Spanish citizens
who trust their government has fallen from 48% to 34%. 17
Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report released by the

European Commission in February 2014 revealed that 95% of
Spanish citizens believe that corruption is widespread in Spain. 8 8
The Commission also found that among all EU-member nations, the
people of Spain were most likely to respond that corruption
personally affected them, and that their political parties were not
sufficiently transparent and supervised.1 89
While these reports suggest a general lack of trust among
Spaniards in their political figures and institutions, the more relevant
inquiry is how well Catalans trust the Catalan political system and
how it could affect their future as an independent nation. As critic
Maureen O'Donnell asserts, in a nation at a "critical juncture," such
as a post-separation transition, "perceptions of corruption" can
determine "whether, in the eyes of much of society, the state is the
solution or the problem." 90 Though the Catalans' trust in their own
government, politicians, and separatist party leaders is not easily
measurable, it is likely that a general mistrust in the central Spanish
government may be transferred to the Catalan government and its
actors if they are perceived to be similarly corrupt.
In November 2013, a poll of Catalan citizens taken by the
Madrid newspaper El Pais suggested that Catalans are "profoundly
discontented" with Spain's obstinance toward their plea for
independence, as well as the leadership of Catalan President, Arturo

186 See,

e.g., EUROPEAN COMM'N, PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN
OPINION: FIRST RESULTS 7 (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ public opi

nion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78 first en.pdf.
187 OECD, How's LIFE? 2013 MEASURING WELL-BEING COUNTRY
SNAPSHOT: SPAIN (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/statistics/HsL-Co
untry-Note-Spain.pdf.
188EU Anti-Corruption Report, supra note 119, at 6.

189 Id., at 7. Greece and Spain tied with 63% of citizens polled
responding that they believe they are personally affected by corruption. Id
Eighty-seven percent of Spanish citizens respondents said that their political
parties are not sufficiently transparent and supervised. Id.
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Regional news sources, like the Barcelona-based Catalan

News Agency, also acknowledge that the recent reports of corruption

among Catalan political leaders have resulted in massive "outrage
and concern" among citizens, in addition to an increasing
"detachment toward politics and democratic institutions."l 92
For its part, The Catalan Project, a London-based office of the
Catalan National Assembly working to advance the dialogue on
independence, openly recognizes essential flaws in the current
system of government, including the politicization of the
administrative appointments and a lack of protection for
whistleblowers, which have caused Spain to lag behind other
European nations in preventing corruption.' 93 Taking an optimistic
viewpoint, The Catalan Project maintains that if Catalonia were able
to start from scratch as an independent nation, it could enact laws that
would allow it to reach the levels of integrity in the governments of
the northern European nations.194
According to O'Donnell, the "objective" of anti-corruption
efforts should not always be viewed "in terms of eliminating
corruption," but "in terms of ensuring that the state is seen to be
making a credible effort to address it."l 95 From this perspective, it is
significant that Mas's administration has publicly acknowledged the
gravity of the current problem and is making considerable efforts to
improve the situation.' 96 Though they face an uphill battle, Catalan
leaders must continue to take steps to improve the public confidence
in their leadership and in the integrity of Catalonia's political system.
If the Catalan people ultimately succeed in gaining their
independence, the perception that the government is moving away
from corruption and toward political integrity may very well allow
them to make a successful transition.
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(Nov. 4, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://www.thelocal.es/20131104/catalonia-backs
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193 See The Catalan Project Design, After Independence, What'll
Happen Insofar as Corruption?, CATALAN NAT'L AsSEMBLY (July 2, 2013),
http:/anc-london.cat/20 13/07/02/after-independence-whatll-happen-insofar-a
s-corruption/ (video in Spanish).
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CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, it is likely that the Catalan people's lack of
trust in their politicians and government institutions would represent
a critical issue for a newly independent Catalonia. On the positive
side, Catalonia has long been a part of one of the world's most
developed nations, and has functioned as an autonomous government
to varying degrees throughout the centuries. It is also fortunate that
Catalonia's regional government already has a substantial framework
of anti-corruption laws and institutions in place, including the AntiFraud Office, which has been the leading body for anti-corruption
efforts in Spain since 2008.197 While corruption would certainly be a
significant obstacle for a newly independent Catalonia, it would not
be an insurmountable one if Catalan leaders were able to convince
the public that they are moving toward the eradication of corruption
from their government institutions and the renewal of political
integrity.

19 See ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT,

supra note 112, at 13.

